History Rememberance Day and Myths Part 4

Good day all, I hope this latest missive finds you in good health! Today is November 11, and I hope that all my readers will remember to pause for a minutes silence at 11 am this morning.

Considering that it is now Remembrance Day I have left off discussion of the nuts and bolts as it were of the Great War. Now I feel it is time to talk about just two aspects of that awful conflict. What it was about and was it worth it?
Those two are very difficult to bring up now almost a hundred years later. I do however still clearly remember the few conversations I had with my Grandfather Harry House, he was lying in a hospital bed by a window in what must have been a Veterans ward. He was almost blind from the shrapnel wound he’d received long decades before. Now I was just a young child and, I suppose I didn’t know any better, or maybe it was just the insatiable curiosity of the young. So of course I asked him about the War. To my father’s surprise ‘Pop’ spoke for about fifteen minutes on what he’d seen and what had happened. That in my father’s experience was the longest conversation he’d ever heard about the event that had so affected the House clan. Harry House in all the long years since had never spoken about the horror and suffering he must have seen daily, and the loss of friends and mates. It was something remembered ‘personally’ a long running grief.

Now this is in a way, my own personal section, I did not serve in any great conflict though I did serve in the Army reserves, and apparently until a few years ago was still liable to be called up if we had a national crisis. I have however over the years spoken to quite a few veterans of both World Wars and I have also studied letters, journals, memoirs, official reports and histories about those conflicts. I can try and be dispassionate and just explain dryly the impartial forces of history, that unseeing and unfeeling smashed over so many families. Other historians can do that, I however cannot. Those losses in the trenches are to me very real, the agony of being evacuated from Gallipoli in the last month as a dysentery case and months of convalescence for Harry House does effect how I examine the past.

As I said above I have read through a large number of books and first hand accounts of the Great War and I now find that my beliefs on this disaster have changed. No, not about the slaughter of millions, but rather the individual and collective responsibility for that tragedy. It has hardened my resolve that we must maintain the deep and a biding debt of memory that we owe to those who believed they were doing their duty and protecting their families and country.

The Losses

Some twenty years ago I read a very strange book on the First World War, looking back I can see it as revisionist history of the worst kind. The historian tried to pass over that the losses on the Western Front probably weren’t that bad and when taken as an averaged proportion of the population were not as severe as many other writers and historians had made out. I actually had to pause a moment and look intently at the book and it was an act of supreme restraint not to give it the pitch and slam it against the wall, if I recall aright the work was a justification of General Haig and his strategies at The Somme and other similar blood baths. I tried to figure out how any imbecile could get away with that piece of drivel and felt so angry. Only recently have I come to realise that in the past decades General Haig who since has gained the appellation of ‘Butcher’ Haig was poorly served by this revisionist idiot. Though Haig does bear some responsibility as the commander of the British forces on the Western Front, he was as much a victim of technology and circumstance as the lowest soldier in the trenches. He wasn’t some unfeeling monster who coldly and thoughtless sent thousands to certain death ‘Over the Top’. Those commanders did exist and unfortunately there were quite a few on both sides.

Back to the first point of that revisionist the losses were not so great when put against the total size of manpower and population figures. Well I remember reading more than one eyewitness account on both sides of men who’d volunteered with all their fellow classmates or other lads in the town, factory or village. I must mention that these personal memoirs number in their hundreds and all of them have in common one fact. Due to injury or illness or chance these men avoided one or more of the battles that their unit was involved in. Later they record, with what must be a mix of horror and guilty relief that by the end of the campaign, they are the lone survivor of all their companions.

Another example is the loss of the British battle cruisers at the Battle of Jutland, the Princess Royal and the Queen Mary, (photo) they both exploded instantly on being hit by shells. The cause was most probably technical and operational defects, and thus two thousand men went to the bottom of the North Sea. There were no survivors, and the action happened within minutes of the opening of the battle. Unfortunately that was all too often the story of the Great War, the technological application of destruction far out weighted the brave fragility of men.

The Justification

That is just a small sample of the losses, the question we always ask at the end of a conflict is, was it worth it? Well to Harry House, for whatever the pain and suffering you and your companions went through, I fear that we had little choice. It may sound like a phrase of arrant jingoism and utilising the tone of unregarding sniffy superiority of the sort that I loath. However I sit here, somewhat poor in worldly wealth, writing about this and my children go to school in essentially a peaceful relatively safe country. I think despite our current very minor complaints we have a good life, thanks to them.

That was not the intention of the German elite. It is a fundamental truth borne out by historical records and archives, that the German General Staff and the highest echelons of government both before and during the First World War was actively trying for the complete subjugation of Europe. In an act of further insanity, by 1917 in the darkest and grimmest days of the war, they were already planning on a second and later stage of the conflict that would cripple Britain, secure Belgium and knock out any threat from America. All this was irrespective of the millions of men lost by then on both sides, as well as the employment of any justifiable weapon or tactic so long as it gave them victory. So to all those post modern revisionists I ask this question. Exactly where in this disaster, is the responsibility to a people, or a nation that is entrusted in the care of those who govern?

So to Harry House, it is to my profound sorrow that you had to experience that awful horror and I can only offer you two pieces of consolation. If the Great War had happened several years later, as was originally planned then it would have been worse. The second is your family does now understand what you went through, and we do appreciate your sacrifice.

Regards Greg House and family

History, Rememberance Day and Myths Part 3

History, Remembrance Day and Myths Part 3
Good day all, I hope this latest missive finds you in good health! As I mentioned in my last post the whole First World War concept can’t be handled in just few hundred words. Its very title states quite plainly that it was a conflict that encompassed the world. How the tragedy and enormity of four years of grinding conflict can be reduced to a Twitter bitlet escapes belief and reason. As in the previous posts I have divided this up into smaller sections covering a few of the more persistent and blatant myths.

The Strategy in the West

Realistically the war has to be divided into several fronts. To many historians the Western front in France and Belgium is regarded as the most important. In a number of aspects this was true, despite the enormity of the Eastern front with Russia and the limitless numbers of the Russian Army. Numbers aside, the German High Command always considered that on the Western Front lay their greatest peril. In their mind the threat was the modern military and technological capacity of France and Britain. This simple fact was borne out by the urgent imperativeness of the Schlieffen Plan.



The Plan

This single operational directive served as a blinker on any and all changing strategic or political events, as it was issued by the ‘Moses’ of the German army, Chief of Staff, General von Schlieffen. As a pronouncement from the supreme German strategic thinker it was as immutable as the ‘Ten Commandments’. Time and again theoretical strategic wargames hammered home the fact that without following its strictly laid out timetable Germany faced the dread certainty of a long two front war and a slow but inevitable defeat.
It seemed impossible for either the political or military leaders of the German Empire to understand that while the railway timetables of The Plan could be finessed to almost perfection. Once the troops de-trained they were reduced to the foot slogging reality of old fashion Napoleonic manoeuvre. This simple fact was not going to be erased whether they followed the original purity of The Plan or even the von Moltke modified form. Either way, its rigid path led them straight into a strategic and political dead end for three simple reasons.


The Plan vs Reality

Firstly, while communication had improved with the telegraph, the telephone and some early wireless transmitters, these modern devices were only available to relatively static corps or army group headquarters. From there getting a message to the cutting edge of the offensive wasn’t so simple. The order or request was written out and given to a messenger on horseback, thus slowing down communication to no better than that at Agincourt in 1415.





Rail or Foot

Secondly, as stated before once off the trains the infantry were reduced to the old marching pace of the Roman legions, and stamina or fitness aside there is only so long they could march and fight at their fastest pace. Any obstruction, confusion or delay threw the schedule off track and as for changes caused by unforeseen action or movement of the enemy, they wrought havoc with the inflexibility of The Plan.

Surprise!

Thirdly The Plan dismissed any action by the British army (British Expeditionary Force or BEF) since in German eyes it was so small and its inclusion in any defence preparations by the French would be irrelevant to the outcome.

In a strict numerical sense the extra five divisions of the BEF didn’t add significantly to the French defence, nor was the ‘Miracle of Mons’ the dominant triumph as declared by generations of British jingoistic writers. The stubborn defence of the Albert Canal at Mons hardly made a dent in the timetable of The Plan. However the unexpected presence of the BEF did upset the mental balance of von Moltke who now wavered, even more beset by doubt- the British shouldn’t have been there! In fact German intelligence didn’t even know they had crossed the Channel. Couple that surprise with the unanticipated retreat of the French Army of Lorraine from the grand trap, and von Moltke’s plans and certainties crumbled. Thus the German General Staff had to leap into the blind future and improvise.

The Trenches

The presence of the trench lines snaking from the Belgian coast by Ostend, all the way to the border of Switzerland, is the single most memorable detail of the Great War. However, despite the fact that it dominated every strategic, tactical, political and industrial facet of the war, it was never meant to happen. On both sides it was initially meant as a brief defensive feature, to last only until the war of offensive manoeuvre was resumed. It took eighteen months of blood drenched offensives for both sides to realise that they had created a monster- an insatiable beast that sucked them dry of men and materials with only yards of churned and chopped up landscape as a reward. Then, once that new reality of the modern battlefield had sunk into the military conscious, all thoughts turned to breaking the stalemate.


The Impasse of ability

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the military training of all the European powers was essentially the same, as was their equipment. A lot has been made of minor increases in the number of machine guns per battalion which in theory gave one unit more firepower than another. At the outset of the war, I believe that this made little difference in the general level of slaughter. Another debated factor is the qualities and quantities of artillery, its design and employment. At the start of the war the advantage clearly lay with the German army. Now weapons and men are only two sides in the triangle of military efficiency, the third is leadership.
In Europe it was freely acknowledged that the training of the German general staff was way above that of either the French or Russians. While aspiring nations always bought British warships, they also employed German military missions to whip their fledgling armies into shape. So it was accepted that the Germans had the edge in organisation and efficiency. In balance it was the smaller British and French senior military staff who had gained the most battle experience in their nation’s many larger and smaller colonial wars. This factor probably helped them muddle through their initial organisational confusion and disarray. It is also said that generals always plan the next war based on the last. In some respects this was true but there is clear evidence that senior officers on both sides tried to adapt to the new tactical and strategic circumstances.

It was an industrial war that employed the most up to date technology of destruction. In the end the carnage did produce men of ability able to understand and employ the modern technical advances. However it was a bloody and expensive training ground. The other problem is the whole ‘lions led by donkeys’ mythology that has since sprung up to ‘explain’ the dramatic losses and waste. Unfortunately for our national psyches this simplistic rational is inadequate. Idiots and fools did abound on both sides, no one having the monopoly on this ‘resource’ and they pervaded all levels in this war as in others. However we cannot condemn the generals for not being the modern equivalents of Wellington or Napoleon.

The New Technology

The First World War has the dubious distinction of being the first modern war to actively embody technological progress as its driving force. A number of historians have claimed this title for the American Civil War with some justification, since it introduced ironclad warships equipped with the revolutionary revolving turrets, railways for the fast transport of troops and supplies and telegraph for almost instant communication. They were the first heralds of the increasing input of steam age technology in warfare. Those were but a precursor




Artillery

Artillery was the greatest cause of carnage and destruction. It could collapse trenches (as happened to my grandfather) and barrages could wipe out exposed infantry. As was soon discovered, but not always remembered, adequate artillery preparation of quality, quantity and accurate targeting produced success. In offensive actions it protected the advancing troops and pounded the enemy trenches and fortifications. While in defence it shredded assaults and halted the movement of reinforcements and supplies.
There is also another difficulty to absorb. While the artillery of the First World War was strides ahead of the old bronze smooth bore 12 pounders of Waterloo or Gettysburg in range, technology and targeting, its task was still beyond its capacity. The average target was usually a narrow trench a few yards wide or belts of barbed wire. Despite the best technical advances of modern science such as sound locators with flash targeting, or more accurate map grids and the use of aerial observation. Perfect accuracy was impossible. An area had to be saturated with days of bombardment to give the best chance possible for hitting the required targets. Unfortunately poor weather or error ruined any observations and the infantry only discovered the problem when they became caught up on the wire, or hammered by untouched machine gun nests.

The Machine Gun

The machine gun has gone down as the most famous killer of the First World War. While its capacity for slaughter was immense, its infamous part in the war was to hinder movement and greatly increase the ability of defence. As a technological and industrial innovation, it heralded the new aspects of modern warfare. The weapon could and did fire non stop for hours, so long as it had a crew and they could keep it cooled, clean and supplied with ammunition. It was not until the invention of the Lewis gun or Browning automatic rifle a mobile weapon and it was essentially used as a defensive weapon to halt the advance of infantry.


When used in conjunction with barbed wire it created ‘killing zones’ where survival was only possible, for, as one officer put it ‘bullet proof soldiers’. In short once a machine gun opened up on your advance you hit the ground if you wanted to live and stayed there until one of two eventualities. First and most hopefully another unit worked its way around the flank and silenced the machine gun. To give an idea of how suicidally dangerous this was, most Victoria Crosses and Military Crosses were awarded for destroying machine gun nests or the fortified bunkers which housed them. The other eventuality if you didn’t move was worse than the threat of the bullets. The enemy would target your unit with a barrage, and exposed and tangled up amongst barbed wire or trapped in the waste of No Mans Land you were as good as dead.

The Cavalry

In too many books and articles the existence of large cavalry divisions on the Western front has been portrayed as the ultimate in backward thinking of the First World War generals- old walrus moustached men obviously trapped in the time warp of great Napoleonic charges with flashing sabres and lances and colourful gaudy uniforms, lost in the glories of the immortal Charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava or running down the Sudanese at Omdurman. No doubt for many officers in all armies this was true, and I understand it is a frequent accusation levelled at General Haig. Once more the reality is not so simple.
Infantry and artillery were required to break the trenches stalemate to allow the cavalry to ‘exploit the gap’ and ‘rapidly’ flank the static enemy divisions in the trench lines. This was the theory behind most of the blood drenched assaults from the Somme to the Third Ypres. As unpalatable and repugnant as that slaughter is to us now it didn’t change the physical mechanics of movement in 1914-1918. Cavalry moved at twice the speed of infantry, if you wanted to outpace the enemy reinforcements heading for a break in the line only cavalry had the speed. However the great problem was that after the kind of bombardment required to breach the trench fortifications and the wasteland it created, cavalry could not move fast enough to gain the advantage.








The Problems of Attack

This created an almost insurmountable tactical and strategic conundrum for commanders on both sides of the Western front. A narrow targeted offensive of a thousand yards width and fifteen hundred yards depth could succeed with minimal cost in casualties and could be well covered by artillery. By late 1916 the British army had developed this offensive and titled it ‘Bite and Hold’. However it left too narrow a gap of pulverised terrain that could be easily targeted by barrage or counter attack and of course, slowed down the ‘break through’ movement by men and horses to a crawl. The other difficulty that many commanders found unpalatable about the concept of ‘Bite and Hold’, was exactly how many men was an acceptable cost for that much ground, and worst of all, where did it lead?
The other option was the wide based offensive, such as the Battle of the Somme where a twelve mile long stretch was targeted for a multi army sized assault. It would, if it succeeded provide the space for a break through, smashing open the enemies line with lots of room for manoeuvre and too wide a gap to be closed by counter attack or artillery barrage. That was the plan for the Somme. As plans went it looked good on paper. However no plan is ever perfect and the Battle of the Somme vomited into the harsh light of reality the limits of technology, leadership and communication.
At this point I think is a good place to pause and reflect on a few issues. First the Great War has been frequently described as a modern war. This simple statement is true, in a large number of respects. Such as the latest improvements in what we understand as modern technology, like communication and logistics. Its soldiers wore modern basic field uniforms that are easily recognisable today, and the principal weapons of machine gun, rifle, mortar, grenade and artillery are still in use. All this familiarity for what is now a conflict almost a hundred years old. However this familiarity is deceptive and is a mirage. The attitudes, strategy and tactics of the First World War are embedded in the ninetieth century. Celebrated commanders of that era like Stonewall Jackson and Ulysses S Grant would have fitted in perfectly as First World War generals, while the soldiers of 1864 vintage would have found life in the trenches a familiar routine.

The technology of battle had now surpassed the capacity of the commanders to control and though communication was in theory instantaneous, in the battle zone it was frequently no faster than a man’s ability to safely crawl from shell hole to crater, maybe ten yards an hour. The battlefield was now, for the first time in history beyond the immediate influence of any higher commander, as they now found themselves reduced to impotent blinded spectators groping for information and direction.
These and other limiting factors we will explore in part 4

History Remembrance Day and Myths Part 2
Good day all, I hope this latest missive finds you in good health? Since November is now with us I thought we’d continue our examination of one of the most important days in that month’s calendar and now that the Melbourne Cup, has finished it time to go on to the second part of our series on the Great War. Once more we will be disposing of a number of misconceptions and myths regarding that terrible conflict.



First; The Plans



In the last part of the Industrial Steam Age the manner of warfare had as most historians agree changed dramatically, the first signs of this transformation had appeared in the American Civil War of 1861-1864. I have covered part of this surge of development in my prior article on WMD’s through the ages, in regard to the naval developments with the first modern ironclad warships; the USS Monitor and the CSS Merrimac/Virginia. While these threatened the naval balance of power the greatest leap forward was in communication. It was the first war where the respective commanders in chief could receive real time intelligence and reports via telegraph. So the reports of success or failure could be managed with reinforcements rushed close to the area by the other wonder of the age, the railway.


The Railway

The steam train and railway had an extremely important impact on all facets of ninetieth century society, it provided an almost unlimited mobility to freight and people. By rail they could be transported to the ever increasing boundaries of the network, distance that previously took weeks by river or rutted dirt track could be covered in days. To the modern military observers of that conflict this new advance in logistics and movement set them theorising on the possibilities. An army need no longer be restricted by poor weather or slow down its campaign to forage for supplies. So long as a rail line was nearby an army was liberated from the previous limitations of manoeuvre that had dogged every commander from Caesar to Napoleon. We will explore the ramifications of this development in the next section, in the meantime there was one more crucial factor of the Civil War that had set the European military a thinking; conscription and mobilisation.


Mobilisation

This idea of rapidly creating a national army by conscription was not new, the revolutionary armies of the France proved that they could stand off and defeat the professional armies of Austria, Prussia and Britain. That linked with the growing manufacturing capacity of the early Industrial Age kept up a ready supply of uniforms, weapons and gunpowder. However as stated before the harnessing of the latest technologies had given these instant armies a new speed and greater punch. Now in contrast to the usual image of generals always planning for the last war, the European high commands pondered the opportunities now available and how best to use them. Surprisingly none was more radical and innovative than the Prussian/German army, famous for its rigid traditions and adherence to hierarchy.



AJP Taylor and the German Railway Timetables

When I was in high school decades ago studying modern history, we had to deal with the path to World War One and the Weimar Republic in some detail. A major part of that was an analysis of AJP Taylor’s then recent book War by Timetable (1969). The prominent and in some cases notorious British historian maintained that the need for a speedy mobilisation and transport by all the competing European powers increased the chance of war. He viewed it as an early and failed form of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) that rather than serving as a brake to potential conflict closed diplomatic solutions as competing timetables locked into place. In some respects this was a reasonable view of events when seen from the distance of fifty years. However all historians are limited by two factors, first the social and political flavour of the period they are writing in. Second access to information, in 1961 German historian Fritz Fischer released his decade’s long study of the archives of Imperial Germany in his book Germany’s Aims in the First World War. It came up with the then controversial proof that the Imperial German government had been actively planning for a war to secure colonies and a ‘rightful’ dominance in Europe. Since then his conclusions have not been successfully refuted. It also throws doubt on Taylor’s Timetables argument as a thinly veiled criticism of the Nuclear confrontation of the US and Russia. Other historians maintained that it was the alliance treaties that separated Europe into two polar blocs, each a rival to the other and that created the tensions pushing each into the war. I do not think it was that simple, individual nations and their leaders in each alliance were frequently more influenced by their own distinct political and economic agendas. Those I believe were more crucial in the decision to join the war, than any amorphous external association.
Now having got that complex section of rival theories out of the way we will examine very briefly and simply the concepts of the various participants’ plans.



France



The French plans shifted and changed depending on which school of military thought had control the French general staff, the GQG. From the crushing defeats of 1870 to the early twentieth century they were purely defensive in nature, with only a few flutters of adventurism. All plans emphasised fortifications and blocking positions by the French army, Verdun as a gateway fortress was in held particular significance. By the early twentieth century this defensive attitude was treated with scorn by a number of French writers, claiming that it admitted to an inherent ‘cringing inferiority’ to the Germans.
With the resurgence of France as a colonial power this apparent subservience was pushed aside as the French military looked to a past before the disaster of 1870 and rediscovered the Furor Gallicae. The spirit of élan vital of the Revolution of 1789 and then translated that into the new military doctrine. According to this theory the French are by disposition a valorous race and always perform best in the attack. Therefore the best defence for France was attack!
This new strategic and tactical idea was given the title of Plan Seventeen and shifted focus to a much more aggressive stance, advocating a full on assault into the contested territory of Alsace–Lorraine. Thus for GQG this new plan married two key aims of French military aspiration and national policy. The first objective was to regain the lost provinces and the second to halt or break up the predicted German offensive that they knew was being planned.
The main aspect of this plan while proclaiming the essential need for offensive al a bayonet! was still in essence a defensive reaction, it would only swing into play if Germany threatened.
If the difficulty was with Britain, as during the brief flurry of the ‘Fashoda’ incident, the plans were vague. Targets such as Gibraltar and Malta were suggested, as was commerce raiding. However the traditional historical dominance of the Royal Navy and speed of British ship construction made any French advantages fleeting. As for military retaliation, that could only occur where colonial territories abutted since the channel was still a barrier. Realistically since the British could at will strangle French trade or severe the links to North Africa, any nationalistic anti-British rancour tended to be limited to blasts in the popular press or brief public protests. On another level the increasing ties of social interaction, culture and trade between London and Paris smoothed over these minor disputes.

Britain


It was a common belief in Britain that they could scorn the affairs of Europe since the barrier of the Channel was an effective shield, however that didn’t create a consciousness of isolationist as did the expanse of the Atlantic for the United States. The British government understood that like it or not geography and history made the island kingdom a long term player in the affairs of Europe. The barrier of the surrounding seas was not such a bulwark from foes, it could and had been a frequent highway for invasion. The French historian Braudel would say their foreign policies were shaped by environmental determinism. The key being the dominant weather patterns, first the Gulf Stream carried the Armada from Spain to the south coast of Cornwall then along to the Dover straits. While the currents of the North Sea provided a different peril as it washed from Norway along Denmark then past the Low countries of Nederland and Belgium. N.A.M. Rodger a distinguished naval historian in his amazing three volume history of the Royal Navy repeatedly pointed out the vulnerability of that cross channel stretch from Ostend to Dunkirk. It was the tender spot of British international politics and whom ever held it was a potential enemy.
This simple fact rather than any humanitarian or neighbourly concern is what prompted Britain after the Napoleonic Wars to unconditionally guarantee the independence of first the Nederlands than then Belgium. Every European nation was warned that if they threatened that ‘neutrality’ then the might of Britain would be used against them. That aside the other factor that caused immediate British concern was the development of a fleet that could threaten their naval dominance. Which is exactly the course that Kaiser Wilhelm and his naval advocate Admiral Tirpitz embarked upon.
As for active plans, in case of threat they didn’t actively call upon the army as did most of Europe. The largest part of the British forces where spread throughout the empire, especially in India. Anyway in time of peril it wasn’t the army that Britain traditionally tended to call upon, it was the senior service, the Royal Navy. Before 1910 Britain felt safe and secure behind the steel walls and massive guns of the Royal Navy’s Dreadnoughts and Battle cruisers. So a large standing army or mass mobilisation was not required, thus their home forces were but a fraction of those on the continent. Essentially up to the day war was declared British plans were nebulous, the only certainty was the Admiralty plan. The Royal Navy would immediately mobilise then head for the safe harbour of Scapa Flow which also blocked the northern exit of the North Sea. There was also an iron clad guarantee that the Royal Navy would defend the French section of the Channel. Though, that agreement was probably more motivated by self interest than any real concern for France.

Germany



Germany was obsessed with two strategic problems, the first was the resurgence of France and their rising nationalism that proclaimed the ‘regaining of Alsace-Lorraine’ as a ultimate French ideal. The second was the massive Russian empire on its eastern border, and the teaming hordes of savage Cossacks that populated the overly fertile paranoia of the German imagination. Despite the efforts of Bismarck to separate the two potential ‘enemies’ Kaiser Wilhelm’s rash posturing and threats drew them together in an unlikely alliance. Even worse was to come, Wilhelm’s desire to emulate the Royal Navy created the twentieth century’s first arms race as he commanded that Germany equal Britain in the construction of Dreadnought Battleships. Unwillingly and reluctantly Britain was pushed into an alliance with the centuries old enemy, France and as a consequence the despised Tsarist Russia. Germany’s answer to this two front threat was the Schlieffen plan, which commanded an invasion of France via Belgium. In fact in response to a possible threat from Russia the plan was the same, invade France. Britain’s inclusion as a possible foe, rather than cause a pause or rethink of diplomacy and strategy just consolidated the iron hard resolve of Invade France!

Russia

Tsarist Russia had undergone a troubled and tumultuous transition to the twentieth century. Its Baltic and Pacific fleets were destroyed by the new and more modern Japanese navy in 1905. While the Russian possessions in China, Port Arthur, had been seized by victorious Japan and the Tsar had avoided mass rebellion by the narrowest of margins. In spite of those military and political disasters the fabled might of Russia with its potential millions of solders was a spectre that haunted both the German and Austro-Hungarian empires. Perhaps it was a folk nightmare from the Napoleonic Wars or even a distant memory of the Mongol onslaught. In sheer numbers it was a real fact to contemporary military planners of all nations. However the Great Russian Empire was struggling to modernise in both industry and armaments and endless hordes of warm bodies didn’t count if they marched without artillery and machine guns. The Russian plan wavered between two extremes the first was to use space like they did in 1812 and wait for the distance and vastness of Russia to wear down the enemy. While the second advocated a steamroller like offensive moving inexorably forward unstoppable until it reached either Berlin or Vienna. That of course was the plan whether the Russian army, its communications or logistics was capable of this feat was another matter.

Austro-Hungarian Empire

Ostensibly the wronged party in the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand their plans called for mobilisation in the eastern provinces’ to defend against Russia and an overwhelming assault on Serbia. As it turned out the offensive to smash the Serbs collapsed and was driven back across the border, while the responses to the Russians had mixed results alternating between modest victory and crushing defeat.

Ottoman Empire
At the outbreak of hostilities between Germany, Austria-Hungary and France, Russia and Britain the Ottoman Empire did not immediately seek to honour it prior treaty as a Central Power. It had not recovered from the losses it suffered in the First and Second Balkan War or its war with Italy that lost Libya and the Dodecanese islands. The Turks were desperately trying to modernise and had commissioned two Dreadnought battleships from British shipyards, while their army endeavoured to upgrade training and equipment via the German military mission. The new government of the Young Turks was deeply divided by faction and interest. Half swaying towards the traditional protection of Britain from the peril of Russian ambitions, while the others waivered in the direction of Germany.
In the end it was an accident of lost opportunity, arrogance, imperatives of naval defence and the actions of two German cruisers that forced the Turks to join the Central Powers. To gain the full flavour of the bizarre story all I can suggest is read Guns of August by Barbara Tuchman or Castles of Steel by Massie both are superb in outline the paths to war.

Italy

Italy had signed the treaty with the Central Powers or as then called the Triple Alliance. Though, when push came to shove, they used the aggression of Germany in Belgium and the invasion of France to claim exception from the ‘defensive’ pact. According to their plan the combined fleets were to rendezvous at Messina and wrestle control of the Mediterranean from the French. At the outbreak of war the inclusion of the British Royal Navy in that equation brought a sobering dose of reality. A glance at any map shows that Italy, except for its northern border is all coastline and several of its largest cites are coastal ports such as Venice, Genoa Naples and Messina. This geographic fact along with the prospect of losing access to vital wheat imports from Russia and fuel imports from Romania outweighed the dubious attractions of the German Austro-Hungarian alliance.





The Results and the Treaties

As can be seen from a brief review of the various plans some were extremely aggressive others more defensive in intent. However they were in July to August 1914 only plans, concepts outlined on paper and though practiced in military exercises not chiselled in stone as holy writ, except in the guilty imaginations of some military commanders. As transpired in the furnace of battle they did warp and change to fit perceived threats and opportunities. In the decades since a number of historians have stressed the connection between the two treaty blocs (the Entente Cordiale and the Central Powers) and how these two opposing arrangements somehow pushed each group straight down the path to Total War. In this discussion I have not emphasised this stance since as far as I can see the evidence that has emerged since then tends to indicate that this wasn’t the case. The rigid hierarchy of treaties and plans did not march lock step into war.
There was no absolute certainty that France would act militarily against Germany in line with its treaty with Russia. While the Tsarist Empire due to distance and insufficient transport had to mobilise as early as possible. Though that action itself was no guarantee it would invade the Austro Hungarian to defend the Serbs. Across the channel affairs were even more nebulous. Britain had made naval protection agreements with the French as well as a secret agreement to send military forces to France in case of invasion. In the later case the British government waivered on whether they should stick to the secret treaty or hold off. This hesitancy lasted up to the news that Germany had invaded Belgium, then old instincts kicked in, the German High Seas Fleet could not be allowed to gain a foothold on the Dover straits.
As can be seen one single nation had the capacity to halt the course for the war, Germany. Unfortunately as we have seen in part one it had neither the intention nor the leadership. Now in part two it is plain that its aggressive war plan took little account of diplomatic shifts or included even the slightest grasp of political or strategic reality. It embraced the opportunity for war and according to the predictions of The Plan its victory over France was assured, its dominance of Europe guaranteed. Whether war with France, or invasion of Belgium and antagonising of Britain was justified was dismissed as irrelevant.

By all until part 3

As the good doctor says; ‘Take the damned pills!’

History, Remberance Day and Myths

History Remembrance Day and Myths

Good day all, I hope this latest missive finds you in good health? Since November is fast approaching I thought we’d examine one of the most important days in that month’s calendar and no I don’t mean the Melbourne Cup, the horse race that stops a nation. If that’s what you where expecting then I suggest you go to a racing website.







Like many Australians I have a family connection to the Great War, My paternal grandfather Harry House served in the First AIF as a pioneer. He landed at Gallipoli two weeks in and was evacuated suffering from severe dysentery a few weeks before the withdrawal. After recuperating he joined his battalion in France in time for the AIF assault on Pozieres, were he went down seriously injured in an artillery barrage. I remember meeting him three times as a lad, once in a veteran’s hospital, he was by then completely blind having lost one eye in the explosion. He however was relatively fortunate, on my wife’s side her family lost Cecil McIntyre, died aged twenty three in the sleet and mud of Armentieres. (See photo below)








While his brother Sidney McIntyre was promoted to captain via battlefield commission and awarded the Military Cross. I think two more relatives may have been seriously wounded but haven’t had the time to track down their records. That I may add is just the First World War, as for the later conflict I will deal with them in time for ANZAC Day.

Since we are getting close to the one hundredth anniversary of the start of the First World War I believe it is important to look at and explode as it were a number of myths and misconceptions that have grown up around that terrible war. Having recently reviewed my sons’ history textbooks I found that they were full of the most basic mistakes and erroneous assumptions that appeared to ignore a lot of the modern research of the past thirty years. Even worse I found myths and suppositions had magically transformed into solid historical fact. For me that was too much to accept. Considering that history shapes us and our world every day I found that sloppiness disturbing. I am not after a jingoistic or nationalist version or as they call it a black armband revisionism.

One of the fondest habits of historians is reviewing the past, it is an essential part of their nature and/or profession. So it should came as no surprise that our view on the tragedy of the First World War has changed, due to the discovery of new information or the reconstruct of the jigsaw puzzle of the past. Unfortunately with the gems also come the dross and a growing tendency to misrepresent the past. Some books I personally have found to be pathetically puerile while others like Dreadnought shine searchlight like on our common history.

I do not want to white wash the errors and play up the glories, my research and the conversations with veterans tells me it was grim past imagining. Having talked to them I feel it is my responsibility to give to my children the opportunity to look at their past in as clear a rational light as possible, to see the triumphs and errors of their ancestors and hopefully learn from them. In this series of articles I am trying for impartiality, though I suspect that evidence and upbringing sway me against the blind forces of history theory.


First; The Cause
Yes we all know that a young Serb nationalist was coincidentally in the right place at the right time to assassinate Archduke Ferdinand the heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. That simple fact is covered adequately in most recent recountings in print and in moderately accurate TV programs. After that dramatic event the whole situation becomes very murky as competing agendas and ambitions come into play. The Serbian Black Hand society who arranged the assassination attempts had links back to the head of the Serbian Secret Service. This gentleman had his own plans and had organised matters in the fond hope that the Balkan parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire would spontaneously revolt leaving the area ripe for Serbian intervention. Whether the Serbian government officially knew of this is difficult to tell, however they appeared ill prepared to capitalise on the event. Nor had they engaged the pre-emptive support of Russia, the usual patron of Slavs in European and Balkan affairs.







First let us disregarding the theories of Illuminati and secret cabals of armaments moguls or others who apparently we are informed conspired to bring about a war that would lead to a New World Order. That is just absolute nonsense. It may work in the unreal world of thriller novels or fantasy adventures but such long term commitment, organisation, communication, dedication and secrecy is impossible in any secret society that includes humans. The First World War was started by a perfectly human collection of sins and foibles by those in positions of absolute authority. At this stage I will point out that while the forces of Imperialism, Nationalism and Militarism had a lot to do with the creation of the political tensions and cultural backgrounds for the conflict they did not in themselves create the irresistible tidal flow that swept away all the old nations and their ruling hierarchies. It was the action of individuals that utilised these forces for their own needs, ambitions or self interest.

Now as we have recently seen the Balkans is a mess of conflicting and competing nations and ethnic minorities. Its very geography makes this so, with regions carved up by mountain ranges and river valleys. A modern French historian Ferdinand Braudel spells this out in great detail in his book The Mediterranean, after a few chapters you begin to see how environmental determinism really did shape the conflicts and ethos of the Balkan tribes and kingdoms and especially why they naturally reached out to the surrounding great powers for alliance and aid in their disputes with their neighbours. The unfortunate fact of Realpolitik was that that these great powers included the Russian Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, both bitter rivals themselves in the Balkans. So bringing the interest of larger patrons did little to calm any situation and made the most minor inter-clan banditry across a border into a ready excuse for an all encompassing war. (Bulgarians charging Turks 1912)







Added to this set of tensions was the last surge of colonial expansion, from 1880-1912 the European powers were in a race to snap up the last unclaimed patches of territory or acquire parts of crumbling empires. Britain gained Egypt and the Sudan thus protecting their route to India, France acquired Morocco as a ‘protectorate’ and in the disintegration of the crumbling of the old Ottoman Empire Germany made a dangerous bid for the Western Sahara, prompting the Agadir Crisis. This was seen as a threatening and aggressive act made deliberately provocative by the sabre rattling of Kaiser Wilhelm. The crisis set both Britain and France on edge and coupled with the increase of the German High Seas fleet created real fears of German military expansion and aggression.

Any good political squabble always throws up opportunities, and the Italians in 1911 used the both the growing Balkans crisis and the fragile situation in North Africa to launch an invasion of Ottoman Libya. It had mixed results and teetered on the brink of disaster thanks in part to the military leadership of Mustapha Kemal (Ataturk). When the Italians latter seized the Aegean islands of the Dodecanese the weakness of the Ottomans encouraged Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece to attack the Ottoman European possessions in the First Balkan War. After the success of the first round the victors then savaged each other in the Second Balkan War in a battle for the spoils.

Accepting that the Balkans and North Africa were a vulnerable flashpoints, especially so after the recent bloody round of internecine Balkan warfare. The great powers of Europe had tried to set up a congress of consultation in an effort to defuse rivalries and tensions. Now, you know what they say men of good will gathering together can solve any problem. However that does depend on everyone wanting a continuation of peace to start with. By 1914 that was not the case.
At this stage we can introduce the ‘blind forces of history’ concept and get it out of the way. Some historians love to talk about inevitability and the inexorable sweep of social, economic or political tides. In this they claim the actions of an individual to alter the flow of ‘history’ are irrelevant as it is it path is predetermined. I.e. the war was caused by the surge of rising German economic and industrial growth versus the stagnant French or waning British. It looks good in print as a title header doesn’t it? Quite a few historians have made their reputations on claims like that. The problems is that if that was the factor then all Germany had to do was wait a decade or less and they’d be wealthy enough to buy out the French economy or out compete British mercantile trade. That wasn’t the case, while economic historians love figures and market forces it is leaders of governments and military commanders who dictate their use.








On this line of leadership now is the time to introduce the key figure of the First World War; Kaiser Wilhelm of the house of Hohenzollern, emperor of Germany and grandson of Queen Victoria. If any real blame for that dreadful conflict lies with any single person, then I would have to say it had to be Wilhelm. He held a position of supreme authority and power as the monarch of the strongest military nation in Europe. While Germany in theory had a constitutional monarchical government in the representational Reichstag, its form did not match substance. Wilhelm had complete control over all facets of the military, including promotions and funding, he most importantly had an iron grip on the upper echelons of government, all officials were subject to his appointment. In the entire German Empire there was no person or organisation who could legitimately say no to Wilhelm without being accused of treason.

In a benevolent ruler such overwhelming powers tend to be ignored in the general peace and prosperity, while in a tyrant they are emphasised as justification for rebellion and overthrow. It is a pity that Wilhelm didn’t fit either of these extremes or his rule would have been less fraught with disaster. Instead he was prey to more perilous foibles and ambitions. Wilhelm the man, was driven by obsessions, he loved military uniforms and the grandeur of parades. In that theme he also believed himself to be the supreme warlord and military genius, often taking charge of the General Staff exercises where he always ‘won’. Worst of all he had such a massive inferiority complex that it would have kept a battalion of Freudian psychologists employed for decades. As an example he deeply resented that he hadn’t been born Prince of Wales regarding his Uncle Edward and Cousin George as unfit and ill suited to inherit the British Empire. It was a grudge and canker that gripped the Kaiser’s soul. Wilhelm also suffered a number of other dangerous delusions, first that he was brilliant and clever and secondly that he was possessed of a political acuity that would rival Machiavelli.(Bismark)







That was not the case Wilhelm was easy to manipulate by stronger more ruthless figures like Bismarck, Bethmann-Hollweg and Tirpitz. Each of those encouraged his fantasies to further their own ambitions. This I suspect is the true source of the First World War. Bismarck encouraged military distractions to keep Wilhelm away from government. Tirpitz promised him a navy to rival that of Britain’s causing fear and apprehension were there had once been friendship. Finally Bethman-Hollweg prompted the Kaisers’ grandiose and bellicose proclamations threatening war on those who stood in the way of ‘Germany’s place in the sun’.(chancellor Bethman-Hollweg)








So we move away from blind forces to individuals. Gavrilo Princep shoots Archduke Ferdinand, his uncle emperor Franz Ferdinand asks Wilhelm for support in punishing Serbia for the terrorist crime and active subversion. Wilhelm seeing an opportunity to grandstand issues his infamous ‘blank check’ to the Austro-Hungarian Empire and chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg backs it to hilt as well as suggesting to Wilhelm, he take his summer cruise, so as to look ‘innocent’ during the crisis, giving his chancellor sole control of the situation. At this point the German General Staff usefully advise that if war is to come, this year would be best before the Russian rearmament is completed. Thus the great European wide war moved a step closer. The Austro-Hungarian chancellor seizes hold of the ‘blank check’ as a lifeline to a drowning man. Conrad von Hotzendorf believed passionately that a short sharp shock was the only solution to the strains and stresses of growing national identity by the empires’ disparate regions, threatening the imminent dissolution of the dual monarchy. For him it proved a god sent opportunity to crush the upstart Serbia.
At the this moment of growing crisis in international affairs two major players had already determined on the course of war, for what now can be seen as personal motives. It could even be said that between this small group of individuals and their advisors a conspiracy had sprung up to lull the concerns of a worried Europe shocked by the assassination, but otherwise unprepared for war. Well unprepared except for their respective plans of mobilisation and strategy.
At this stage trembling on the brink of cataclysm we end part one.

As the good doctor says; ‘Take the damned pills!’

History, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Balance of Terror
Good day all I hope this day finds all my readers in good health. Hopefully the course of leeches I prescribed did the trick? Excellent! Always a sound remedy for those of a choleric disposition, and preferable to the practice of cupping or drawing several ounces of blood with a knife and basin. Those more severe methods have always left me slightly uneasy as to their real efficacy for the treatment of illness. To expel black bile and rebalance the body’s natural humours I have rather tended to rely on purgatives or emetics as more immediate remedies. Anyway Medieval and Tudor medicine was very keen on the idea of resorting to what we would consider rigorous procedures to return the patient to the body’s natural harmony or symmetry. In fact one of the main themes of the Renaissance was the struggle between those keen on maintaining the existing ‘Natural Order’ and those who agitated that a newer updated version of the ‘Natural Order’ be incorporated.
As an example of the turmoil this clash caused we can look at the actions of the Tudors monarchs. Henry VIII in particular was naturally pretty heavy on the maintaining of the Natural Order, in both the physical and spiritual bodies of the kingdom. Especially, since their position at the top of the late medieval hierarchy was gained by conspiracy, treachery and the bloody violent overthrow of the legitimate monarch. After that example of the rewards of betrayal it behoved Tudor monarchs to behave quite severely towards similarly ambitious nobles by the simple expedient of beheading any rivals that happened to pop up. Now apart from the draconian laws and punishments pertaining to Treason, Heresy and Praemunire (we’ll cover that last one in a separate article later, in the meantime just think of it as a useful catchall that picks up any opponents the other two missed), the Tudor state had one more important tool of legitimacy, that had English nobles pause in thought;

The Cannon.


Where as in the medieval period the knight was seen as the potent symbol of the religious, political and military hierarchy, by the later 1400s advances in technology had altered the reality behind this steel clad image. While the chivalric and romantic ideals of the knight were venerated in song, story and sculpture by the aristocracy, the reality was somewhat different. The knight still held an honoured, essential and even exalted position on the field of battle. However his participation in combat no longer guaranteed victory as a weapon of war, unless it was in the capacity of a unit captain or senior commander. That battle winning accolade now belonged to a new mistress of the battlefield, the triumph of the artisans and alchemists craft; the cannon; the Tudor version of Weapon of Mass Destruction. As an example of this I am inserting a section from one of my novels (The Queens Oranges) that best explains the new reality of this modern engine of war and their impacts as Renaissance WMD’s;

Red Ned and the Queens Oranges chapter 6 Modern Engines of War © 2010

…It was certainly a widening of Ned’s knowledge, the more he heard regarding the great bronze beast that the three of them affectionately patted, the more awe struck and fascinated he became. These modern devices; the Basilisks, Demi cannons and Culverins were the King’s means to smite and lay waste his foes. If however they were his arms, then the blood and sinews that powered these weapons was the vital black powder, the success of the alchemists craft the ‘Fue d’Artifice’ or “made fire’. It was the ability to balancing the conflicting art, craft, alchemy and perhaps magic that made these two men so valuable to the king’s service. For when carefully measured and weighed the charges, if used with skill could propel missiles that would destroy the greatest walls or alter the fate of nations in battle. Without this blend of skill and the harnessed wrath of the black powder these great weapons of destruction were just mute impotent lumps of bronze and iron.
As an example of their impact on the turn of Lady Fortuna’s wheel Henryk recounted one famous incident. It was at the battle of Ravenna over twenty years ago between the Spaniards and the Lombard League. A single shot from a culverin ploughed into the Spanish line killed thirty men and wounded many more. The horror and shock of the missile’s devastation caused the Spanish companies of horse to precipitously charge in desperation, losing the battle. Ned could understand why the common soldiers feared and venerated their Gonnes, it was a bit like have a savage demon on a loose tether. If the other side had one so did you, possession was essential, no matter the risks or expense.
From the older brother he had a story that warned of the perils of use, King James II of Scotland was besieging the English held castle of Roxburgh when the barrel of his great siege Gonne exploded killing him. Ned had looked doubtfully at the culverin he was leaning on until Henryk assured him that the incident had happened years ago and cannon rarely exploded like that now. That had set Ned’s fears at ease, then Hubrecht gave a low chuckle and add that bronze was still preferred over iron since it tended to bulge before exploding, but. The douche gonner had concluded his reasoning with the sort of shrug and wave of hands in the universal gesture of uncertainty of Lady Fortuna’s favour and Ned’s reassurance evaporated.

After those tales Ned could understand the recent rants from the friars screaming of the coming destruction. Blood and Fire of the Apocalypse! Any city under siege from modern engines of war would witness their own dress rehearsal for St John the Evangelist’s prophetic words. It was no surprise that after the first roar of the Gonnes most towns surrendered. Casting a more knowledgeable look at the iron and bronze instruments, the wonder was that in battle men didn’t break and run at the first salvo. It must take a special kind of resolve to stand and watch the belching gouts of smoke and flame as they lashed towards their ranks.




The Tudor WMD



The weapon of mass destruction is not a recent concept, kingdoms and empires have worked through a number of different variations usually revolving around siege engines or the ultimate warship. The Tudor dynasty was in this respect no different to those of the past or its contemporaries in Europe. At the time the cannon represented the best balance of siege breaking ability and battlefield awesomeness. Even better for those monarchs keen on a centralised government and taxation, the manufacture and maintenance of cannons was an extremely expensive business, almost as expensive as firing them. In this modern age of mass production and general wealth it is easy to lose perspective on the period costs of the simple necessities of war like gunpowder. Once more I quote from the Queen’s Oranges;

“What does it cost for a barrel of powder?” That produced a fierce discussion with much waving of arms, whether those gestures defined sizes, measures or what Ned was unsure but the brothers finally came to an agreement. As before Rob Black was delegated as spokesman, his friend looking both shocked and surprised as he turned to deliver their deliberation.
“Ahh Ned, I’m a bit unclear they… we had to try and translate their usual weights and prices into our equivalents, but they think a barrel of about a hundredweight based on the price at Ghent last month is worth eighty English pounds.”
“What, a barrel! Are you sure?” Ned tried hard to keep the surprise out of his voice, Rob looked puzzled for a moment before rejoining the huddle of experts. Further mutters and expansive gesture signalled the efforts of translation until Rob finally straightened up and walked over with a slightly puzzled smile.
“Yes Ned, they’re certain eighty English pounds it is! The measures and weights was a bit of trouble, since they had to rework douche and imperial standards into London pounds since a good half to two thirds of the powder is bought overseas. Then there was difficulty in the exchange rate for Rhenish florins.” A pair of beard faced nodded in agreement to Rob’s explanation.
“Sweet Jesu, war is an expensive business!” To Ned this shed a new light on the cost of the cannon’s roar at city celebrations, at sixteen hundred silver shillings or two hundred and sixty gold angels a barrel, it was very clear why the King would want to restrict their use to only supremely important royal announcements. He wondered just how much powder was used per Gonne, no doubt these two brothers would know down to the nearest peck, but he’d seen a possible answer for the vanished Ben Robinson.

So in Tudor currency terms two hundred and eighty gold coins a barrel and to put that in even starker perspective the Tower was said at that time (1530) to hold six thousand barrels of gunpowder. Even if we cut that figure down to a more reasonable four thousand the value would be one million one hundred and twenty thousand golden angels just for the gunpowder. To give an idea of contemporary value one barrel of gunpowder is worth around eighty Tudor pounds sterling, to be classed as a gentleman you required an annual income of twenty pounds sterling. As they say war is a very expensive pastime only pursued by Princes. So if you want to either defend the realm or stake your families claim on someone else’s territory chests over brimming with gold and silver are a prerequisite.
So as you can see the old days of raising the banner of rebellion if you didn’t like the monarch or disagreed with their religious inclination, while still possible and indeed in Europe was common. The action though usually overbrimming with zeal and commitment often suffered from a few glaring defects. If the rebels didn’t have access to gold, gonnes and gonnepowder the chance of victory on the battle field or siege was pretty remote.

And where you may ask did the Tudor monarchs keep most of their modern Engines of War?
In the Tower of London, the most heavily armed and secure ‘palace’ in all of Britain. Directly under the watchful eye of the most senior royal officials and just a short boat ride down river from Whitehall, the centre of Tudor administration. In fact the only successful rebellion in the Tudor period was that of Princess Mary Tudor against Lady Jane Grey, Edward VII’s proclaimed Protestant successor. It is worth mentioning that Princess Mary according to some reports and chronicles ‘acquired’ a large number of cannons and armaments from some of the great Tudor warships coincidentally lying off Harwich. Considering what we know from the wreck of the Mary Rose removing and remounting its great gonnes for transport would have taken a large shipyard like Greenwich and some time.



Also these miraculous cannons were unlikely to be from some local noble’s own stock since to possess any cannon required a royal licence. No Tudor monarch was keen on letting such potent weapons stray out of royal supervision. So is it possible that Mary Tudor was lent some ready made WMD’s by her Hapsburg uncle Emperor Charles V from across the channel in Bruges? That could be a point to investigate at a later date.
It is also worth noting that Tudor WMDs weren’t pulled out at the merest whim, it required a lot of effort and expense to see that they were deployed with adequate support. The widowed husband of Mary, Philip of Spain in a later effort to unseat his former sister in law Elizabeth used a sizable fleet the Armada to transport his WMDs in 1588. Despite the brave words of her Majesty’s Tilbury speech it is just as well that Howard, Drake and the English fleet drove off the Armada. Since it was commonly considered that once it had landed its WMD’s and supported by the Duke of Parma’s veteran pike and muskets would have demolished the English defences within days.


Up dating WMD’s


The basic gonnepowder cannon reigned supreme, for hundreds of years, it was the queen of battles and arbiter of nations from late medieval to the later part of the ninetieth century, essentially unchanged as a weapon. Then during that explosion of invention that was the Victorian steam age it experienced a serious technological upgrade, more than quadrupling its range and capacity for destruction and creating the first of the twentieth century’s WMD’s;


The Dreadnought WMD



There was nothing new in fitting cannons to ships. The utility of a gonne powder ballistic weapon in ship to ship and then ship to shore battle was soon realised as an improvement on the previous catapults and ballista’s. Its initial integration in naval warfare was fitful, as the technology of cannons clashed with the requirements of a timber maritime vessel. Since they were propelled by oars or sail the placement of heavy iron or bronze cannons could and did impair their need to stay balanced and afloat in difficult conditions. The proof of this conflict was the loss of both the Mary Rose and the Vasa both of which sunk due to improperly closed lower gunports when the vessels were heeled over by a sudden wind.



It has been suggested by some marine historians that the Elizabethan ship designers and cannon manufacturers were the first Europeans to fully integrate the race galleon as a primary gun platform naval vessel, rather than being a standard vessel with cannons added. In time this idea of a full time dedicated naval gun platform took hold amongst the western nation states as they competed for control of resources, prestige and trade. Thus we come to the British three decker ship of the line like the HMS Victory a purpose designed and constructed battle ship with one hundred and twelve cannons the most powerful weapon of its day. As mighty and graceful as these vessels were, the advances in both iron and steel technologies during the industrial revolution transformed them into relics of former glory. The modern face of battle by 1860 was a steel hulled warship such as HMS Warrior.


And Britannia still ruled the waves until the American Civil War. The clash of the USS Monitor and the CSS Virginia on the 9th march 1862 proved that technology and innovation under the pressure cooker of conflict could move very fast.



This speed of improvement turned out to be very expensive for modern nations aspiring to the ultimate in battle wear accessories like an up to date fleet. Also important in seizing and protecting those overseas colonies required for the status of empire. This competition reached its technological, financial and design apogee in the construction of HMS Dreadnought in 1906.




On the day of its launching it became the most expensive, advanced and powerful weapon in the world. With its massive 12 inch guns it could lob an armour piercing shell 18 kilometres. For speed she could travel at 21.4 knots or around 40 kilometres per hour and her armour was the latest steel compound and at its thickest was 11 inches. This was the ultimate in Steam Period WMD. No other world class navy or shore battery could stand up to its salvos and she was specifically designed to sink any ship or combination of ships afloat. As for potential destructive power there was nothing to surpass it until the much later American and Japanese super battleships.
The Dreadnought class of warship was regarded as such a serious threat that international treaties were negotiated to limit its spread and balance out the number of battleships per nation, thus providing the world with the first balance of terror for the twentieth century. It is perhaps rather sad and disappointing for us a hundred years later that our WMD’s do not look so majestic or stately and out weigh HMS Dreadnought in destructiveness by a factor of thousands if not tens of thousands.

The thread of this story began with Tudor medicine then onto the Tudor status quo and how it was maintained by law and Tudor period military technology with a few brief excursions into historical fiction. Then we had a very quick coverage leading up to the awesome weapons of the 1900’s the Dreadnought. From the cannon to the battleship all of these fitted into the classification of WMD’s. All of them were meant to be seen as instruments of threat, or defence of the realm. As symbols they mostly they just sat around reminding people of what could happen if…
Such is the currency of deterrence. However in these modern and enlightened times WMD’s are hidden objects of terror and suspicion capable of annihilating entire cities.


In that case isn’t it good that we have outgrown religious fanaticism and bigotry? Aren’t we lucky to longer have the Tudor habits of a nation serving the whims of an individual monarch? Aren’t we fortunate that our realms employ WMD’s at the will and discretion of the people rather than to salvage the reputation and claims of our forefathers? Aren’t we just so damn’d superior to our ancestors!!!



Bye all and don't forget take the dammned Pills!!!